From the section on performing heap grooming over the network ("Remote Heap Feng Shui"):
> The current attack is sensitive to network conditions, like RTT and jitter. Low, stable round-trip times are preferred for a more reliable attack. In our controlled environment, we performed this attack over the internet through public IP addresses instead of just assuming perfect laboratory conditions. For the current attack path to achieve optimal stability and reliability in exploitation, Calif turned to physics and utilized money to solve the problem, rather than experimenting with TCP/IP stack configuration. In other words, Calif rented another VM in the same region as our target.
And the "Limitations" section:
> There is no universal payload. Each chain needs a decoder route, a live writer, a returned reader or another feedback path, a heap layout, and an application action. Every target needs a bespoke profile. The exploit is not a universal point-and-shoot.
Based on the complexity and constraints, short-term mass-exploitation seems unlikely. It will take some time before there are reliable exploits, and they may require running on infra close to the target.
But a long tail of unpatched java applications/services at high-value targets getting exploited, seems plausible to me.
* HotSpot VM: any OpenJDK build, Oracle JDK, or GraalVM JDK. Only HotSpot generates the stub. OpenJ9 and GCJ are OK. Azul Prime (Zing), which replaces C2 with its own JIT, and any VM name not recognized as HotSpot are [?], never [!].
* x86-64 JVM on an x86-64 host.
* Version 17.0.6 or later, not at or above a version listed in FIXED_IN, and no newer than the newest releases checked (see below). Newer versions are [?]: they may carry the fix.
* The JVM reports avx512_vbmi and avx512bw, and UseAVX >= 3.
* Base64 intrinsics are on and C2/JVMCI can compile. These turn it off: -XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics, -XX:DisableIntrinsic=_base64_decodeBlock, -Xint, -XX:TieredStopAtLevel below 4.
The write-up itself matches your version assumption, however it also says:
> According to Oracle, the following Oracle Java SE versions are vulnerable: 8u511b33-perf, 17.0.21.0.3, 21.0.13.0.3, 25.0.5.0.3, 27.0.1.0.3. We thank Oracle for providing this information ahead of publication time.
So according to Oracle at least, JRE8 versions are affected as well.
Wouldn't it be prudent for someone to patch even if they aren't running their code on an AVX512 system right this moment? They could be running on one.. next moment.
Depends on the company and deployment method. As Ops person, I generally don't think much about rolling out different Kubernetes Nodes and what SKU I select. So yes, you could be running on one node type today and tomorrow I upgrade the nodes under you.
This looks like Claudese - may be kind to write such things yourself if you intend for humans to read them. (For example, “ HotSpot VM: any OpenJDK build, Oracle JDK, or GraalVM JDK. Only HotSpot generates the stub. OpenJ9 and GCJ are OK. Azul Prime (Zing), which replaces C2 with its own JIT, and any VM name not recognized as HotSpot are [?], never [!].” — I tried parsing at least five times before realizing you’re asking me to decipher LLM talk)
What’s that old Chinese proverb? “May you live in interesting times”? It feels like we’re living in interesting times. How long will it take for a bad actor to seriously compromise critical infrastructure? My bet is within six months.
The upside is that it’ll force legacy institutions and organizations with sub-par security to get good at security and modernize their legacy stacks. That, or get pwned in short order.
A lot of organizations we sitting on internal bugs for years because they thought they were impossible to exploit, and now their red team can break them in hours.
Most businesses are stuck in a trap now. They know the software is exploitable, but they are organizationally slow in testing and rollout. They have to start moving fast with security and IT organizations that are cut to the bone, yet at the same time contain to much box checking deadweight.
I think this bet is optimistically assuming a far more competent world than the one we actually have. Have you seen the idiot clowns actually in power? The agency that might've been tasked with this hypothetical secret scrum, CISA, has been gutted and left to rot because they thought it was an enemy plot to censor them on social media or whatever. There's no secret room where the smart people are fixing things.
They aren’t wrong that we should be deleting more support and removing more features. The idea that the linux kernel by default builds support for all sorts of ancient systems nobody has ever heard of is absurd.
If I owned an entire language platform with a JIT, it would not contain assembly in its standard library, it would simply be improved until it generated something at least that fast from high-level source code on that target CPU.
This is something I really like about LLVM. Their libc isn't spilling over with hand-written assembly. It's written in straightforward C++ under the belief that the compiler does, or will do, a good job.
Encode binary data in text because some dumb thing can't process binary. Text back to binary slow, so better make use of ridiculously wide vector width thing to speed up dumb decoding step we should have never become reliant on in hot paths. Derp, memory safety bug. Derp, die because performance "optimization".
Our incredibly high tower of Jenga blocks is falling down under its own weight.
So many promotions because of optimizing cosmically unnecessary work, though.
Derp, derp, this is humans making computers.
As a person who does these kinds of optimizations, it hits in the feels.
The fact that mainstream modules have such trivial bugs in logic that can be fully covered by testing is staggering. It is about time software developers will have proper test coverage for their code, at least for basic "unit" modules. Maybe we can even name a testing philosophy to match it.
Not sure this is as trivial as it seems. The bug triggers on a specific instruction set, on a precise input length, with a specific character at the end, and when on the hot path, and requires low level memory access checking to be detected.
For the finished jre yes. But one would hope these kind of checks are also run on a hand rolled decoder function. Fuzzing that one and finding logic bugs is a lot easier
Finding these kind of bugs would have required fuzzing and some kind of bound checking canaries. Not sure all bound checkers work on the hand-optimized assembly.
Or as it turns out an LLM! Not clear whether their agent spawned any classic tools...
From the section on performing heap grooming over the network ("Remote Heap Feng Shui"):
> The current attack is sensitive to network conditions, like RTT and jitter. Low, stable round-trip times are preferred for a more reliable attack. In our controlled environment, we performed this attack over the internet through public IP addresses instead of just assuming perfect laboratory conditions. For the current attack path to achieve optimal stability and reliability in exploitation, Calif turned to physics and utilized money to solve the problem, rather than experimenting with TCP/IP stack configuration. In other words, Calif rented another VM in the same region as our target.
And the "Limitations" section:
> There is no universal payload. Each chain needs a decoder route, a live writer, a returned reader or another feedback path, a heap layout, and an application action. Every target needs a bespoke profile. The exploit is not a universal point-and-shoot.
Based on the complexity and constraints, short-term mass-exploitation seems unlikely. It will take some time before there are reliable exploits, and they may require running on infra close to the target.
But a long tail of unpatched java applications/services at high-value targets getting exploited, seems plausible to me.
Super impressive work by Calif as usual.
The exploit conditions are very specific but there are still going to be a lot of hosts impacted. We at Semgrep published some free detection scripts here: https://github.com/semgrep/detection-scripts/tree/main/CVE-2...
They look for these five conditions:
The write-up itself matches your version assumption, however it also says:
> According to Oracle, the following Oracle Java SE versions are vulnerable: 8u511b33-perf, 17.0.21.0.3, 21.0.13.0.3, 25.0.5.0.3, 27.0.1.0.3. We thank Oracle for providing this information ahead of publication time.
So according to Oracle at least, JRE8 versions are affected as well.
25.0.5.0.3 is the latest on the 25 version [0]. Does that mean no patch is available?
[0] https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/javase/jdk25-archiv...
Wouldn't it be prudent for someone to patch even if they aren't running their code on an AVX512 system right this moment? They could be running on one.. next moment.
Sure, but I think it brings it down from "patch immediately" severity, to just "bump the JDK with next service deploy" severity.
Or, do running machines often have their CPU changed from under them without much notice?
Depends on the company and deployment method. As Ops person, I generally don't think much about rolling out different Kubernetes Nodes and what SKU I select. So yes, you could be running on one node type today and tomorrow I upgrade the nodes under you.
This looks like Claudese - may be kind to write such things yourself if you intend for humans to read them. (For example, “ HotSpot VM: any OpenJDK build, Oracle JDK, or GraalVM JDK. Only HotSpot generates the stub. OpenJ9 and GCJ are OK. Azul Prime (Zing), which replaces C2 with its own JIT, and any VM name not recognized as HotSpot are [?], never [!].” — I tried parsing at least five times before realizing you’re asking me to decipher LLM talk)
I still don't understand what's meant with Azul. Is it affected or not? What is it never?
What’s that old Chinese proverb? “May you live in interesting times”? It feels like we’re living in interesting times. How long will it take for a bad actor to seriously compromise critical infrastructure? My bet is within six months.
The upside is that it’ll force legacy institutions and organizations with sub-par security to get good at security and modernize their legacy stacks. That, or get pwned in short order.
> My bet is within six months
My bet is it already happened two months ago and there's a whole secret scrum we only vaguely know about happening right now.
Instability is often correlated to urgently performed change, and we've seen a lot of instability around the world lately.
A lot of organizations we sitting on internal bugs for years because they thought they were impossible to exploit, and now their red team can break them in hours.
Most businesses are stuck in a trap now. They know the software is exploitable, but they are organizationally slow in testing and rollout. They have to start moving fast with security and IT organizations that are cut to the bone, yet at the same time contain to much box checking deadweight.
Instability can also be attributed to AI slop code. That's the simplest explanation.
I think this bet is optimistically assuming a far more competent world than the one we actually have. Have you seen the idiot clowns actually in power? The agency that might've been tasked with this hypothetical secret scrum, CISA, has been gutted and left to rot because they thought it was an enemy plot to censor them on social media or whatever. There's no secret room where the smart people are fixing things.
They aren’t wrong that we should be deleting more support and removing more features. The idea that the linux kernel by default builds support for all sorts of ancient systems nobody has ever heard of is absurd.
Makes me wonder whether we would have the same vulnerability if an LLM had written this decoder. It's tricky to write safe hardware accelerated code.
You can also mitigate Java4Shell by starting OpenJDK with either:
-XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics to disable hardware-accelerated Base64 encoding and decoding, or
-XX:UseAVX=2 to disable AVX-512. Apply this flag only on x86-64 hosts. OpenJDK on ARM doesn't recognize it and will fail to start.
Might be worth examining whether AVX-512 is even supported on the machine before freaking out, too.
Not everywhere... Requires an x86-64 processir with AVX512.
Pretty much any Intel server and most AMD servers are going to support AVX512 and conversely most VMs running in the cloud will have access to it.
Speak for yourself. All my cloud VMs are ARM, with one exception, one s390x running Linux.
This attack surface (manually optimized assembly code in the middle of software stacks) looks AWESOME
The string of A's reminds me of the ssh exploit recently.
If I owned an entire language platform with a JIT, it would not contain assembly in its standard library, it would simply be improved until it generated something at least that fast from high-level source code on that target CPU.
This is something I really like about LLVM. Their libc isn't spilling over with hand-written assembly. It's written in straightforward C++ under the belief that the compiler does, or will do, a good job.
.
This should be the main thread as this is the primary source
Fair!
Encode binary data in text because some dumb thing can't process binary. Text back to binary slow, so better make use of ridiculously wide vector width thing to speed up dumb decoding step we should have never become reliant on in hot paths. Derp, memory safety bug. Derp, die because performance "optimization".
Our incredibly high tower of Jenga blocks is falling down under its own weight.
So many promotions because of optimizing cosmically unnecessary work, though.
Derp, derp, this is humans making computers.
As a person who does these kinds of optimizations, it hits in the feels.
Seems like security through obscurity might be a thing after all.
where is the dancing girl in the exploit videos???
Yes, this is pretty much required now after the last.
I’m probably boring, but IMHO a plain video is easier to digest (:
me using java for so long I have my own util.Base64 class used everywhere in pure java.
now panicking in case some LLM imported this without me noticing.
edit: it did. :(
Just as with CVE-2026-98432, Debian is immediately patched at embargo drop, Ubuntu still isn't patched.
Why do we even pay for Ubuntu?
Are you sure? I can’t see any Debian advisory for this vuln.
https://www.debian.org/security/
Uhh, Debian is NOT patched as of this writing.
Fortunately I run name-brand Oracle(R) Java(tm), which did publish updated packages.
So who leaked it?
Why would anyone write the scalar part of a SIMD'd function in assembly code!?
pure love for the game
"vibe-uncoding" -- have actually been doing quite a bit of that in my older projects.
We set UseAVX=2 on all our jdk hosts last year for unrelated thermal issues, turns out that saved us here
This will almost certainly in practice affect a majority of Java app servers in production.
What makes it nasty is triggering it could be done so easily by url decoding, sending an email or many other things.
The fact that mainstream modules have such trivial bugs in logic that can be fully covered by testing is staggering. It is about time software developers will have proper test coverage for their code, at least for basic "unit" modules. Maybe we can even name a testing philosophy to match it.
Not sure this is as trivial as it seems. The bug triggers on a specific instruction set, on a precise input length, with a specific character at the end, and when on the hot path, and requires low level memory access checking to be detected.
For the finished jre yes. But one would hope these kind of checks are also run on a hand rolled decoder function. Fuzzing that one and finding logic bugs is a lot easier
Finding these kind of bugs would have required fuzzing and some kind of bound checking canaries. Not sure all bound checkers work on the hand-optimized assembly.
Or as it turns out an LLM! Not clear whether their agent spawned any classic tools...
please stop using native code that hasn't been proven